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I. INTRODUCTION
When faced with the challenge of defending someone
accused of arson, counsel has several options but unless there
is overwhelming evidence to indicate that this was in fact an
arson, the first thing counsel should do is retain an expert.
Arson is one of the few crimes for which it is necessary
to first prove that a crime was committed.2 Over this author’s
45-year career, many false accusations of arson have resulted in
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either civil or criminal litigation. As stated in the 2009 National
Academy of Sciences (NAS) report:
The simple reality is that the interpretation of
forensic evidence is not always based on
scientific studies to determine its validity. This is
a serious problem. Although research has been
done in some disciplines, there is a notable
dearth of peer-reviewed, published studies
establishing the scientific bases and validity of
many forensic methods.3
This description applies to all of the forensic sciences,
including fire investigation. Specifically related to fire
investigation, the NAS report goes on:
…much more research is needed on the natural
variability of burn patterns and damage
characteristics and how they are affected by the
presence of various accelerants. Despite the
paucity of research, some arson investigators
continue to make determinations about whether
or not a particular fire was set. However,
according to testimony presented to the
Committee, many of the rules of thumb that are
typically assumed to indicate that an accelerant
was used have been shown not to be true.
Experiments should be designed to put arson
investigations on a more solid scientific footing.4
The problem is that fires are destructive, and the
aftermath of an accidental fire can often look exactly the same
as the aftermath of an intentionally set fire. This confounding
fact has led to many false accusations, false convictions, and
even a wrongful execution.

3 NATIONAL

RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMMITTEE ON IDENTIFYING THE
NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCIENCE COMMUNITY, STRENGTHENING
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According to the National Fire Protection Association
(NFPA), there were about 387,000 residential structure fires in
the United States in 2018.5 Of these, approximately 25,500 were
declared to be incendiary.6 That means that every year, there
are 25,000 chances for fire investigators to make a serious error.
Even if the error rate is only 5%, that amounts to 1,250 miscalls
per year. Given this author’s experience, a 5% error rate is
wildly optimistic.
So the first question that counsel needs to address is “is
this actually an arson fire?”
Following that, additional questions arise.
•

Is this arson investigator actually qualified to render
opinions?

•

Did the investigator employ appropriate methodology
in reaching his opinions?

•

It is origin determination even a valid forensic science
discipline? So far, attempts to demonstrate the validity
of origin determination have failed.

II. IS THIS REALLY AN ARSON FIRE?
Michael Faraday explained the behavior of a simple
candle flame in his Christmas lectures in 1848 and 1860:
There is no more open door by which you can
enter into the study of natural philosophy than
by considering the physical phenomena of a
candle. There is not a law under which any part
of this universe is governed which is not come

NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION, FIRE LOSS IN THE UNITED
STATES IN 2018, at 3, available at https://www.nfpa.org//media/Files/News-and-Research/Fire-statistics-and-reports/USFire-Problem/osFireLoss.pdf.
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into play, and is not touched upon, in these
phenomena.7

So, on the one hand, science can explain fire but on the
other hand, fire is very complicated. The investigation of fires
was historically practiced by firefighters and police, rather than
scientists. When the first NFPA guide for fire investigation was
published in 1992, the discipline was described as “a complex
endeavor involving both art and science.”8 By the fourth edition
of NFPA 921 in 2001, the sentence was changed to read “a fire
or explosion investigation is a complex endeavor involving
skill, technology, knowledge, and science.”9,10
As more scientists entered the field and more
experiments were conducted, we learned that many of the
“indicators” of arson that had been relied on to obtain
thousands of convictions were largely invalid.11 If an arson
determination is based on “low burning” or a fire that burned
“hotter than normal” or “faster than normal,” or was based on
the appearance of “pour patterns” on a floor without a positive
finding of an ignitable liquid in a laboratory test, it needs to be
treated with great skepticism.12
If the only evidence of arson is the finding of a medium
petroleum distillate on a hardwood floor, such a finding is not
BILL HAMMACK & DON DECOSTE, MICHAEL FARADAY’S THE
CHEMICAL HISTORY OF A CANDLE WITH GUIDES TO LECTURES,
TEACHING GUIDES & STUDENT ACTIVITIES 3 (2016), available at
http://engineerguy.com/faraday/pdf/faraday-chemical-historycomplete.pdf.
7
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meaningful in the absence of a comparison sample that tested
negative.13
By the turn-of-the-century, it became generally accepted
that NFPA 921’s approach to fire investigation using the
scientific method was the only valid means of determining
whether a fire was, in fact, intentionally set.
It is always incumbent upon counsel to make an effort
to determine whether there is an accidental explanation for the
fire.

III. IS THE INVESTIGATOR QUALIFIED?
The starting point for this inquiry is the investigator’s
CV and testimony history. This author has seen a fair amount
of “puffery” on CVs. Is the investigator certified? Does he
double count his certifications by referring to the Pro-Board
accreditation of the IAAI-CFI program? Does he claim
“certification” each time he got a certificate for attending a
training course? Falsifying credentials is a mark of a weak
mind. Exposing such puffery or fraud can go a long way in
discrediting an expert.
Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 702 applies to testimony
by expert witnesses, and except in the rarest of cases, the fact
that fire was intentionally set is going to require an expert
witness to opine. Rule 702 states:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education may testify in the form of an opinion
or otherwise if
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or
data;
Lentini, J., “The Persistence of Floor Coating Solvents,” 46(6) J.
FORENSIC SCI.1470-1473 (2001), available at
https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1d_V2v8q8fkWAmsxCD3i
cf6Qi-LYziR47.
13
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(c) the testimony is the product of reliable
principles and methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles
and methods to the facts of the case.14
The qualifications of the expert are thus the first thing
that should be explored both for strategic and tactical reasons.
A significant number of fire investigators do not meet the
definition of someone who is qualified. There is an industry
standard known as NFPA 1033, Standard for Professional
Qualifications for Fire Investigator. This standard applies to
anyone who investigates fires. In the introductory chapter,
NFPA 1033 lists sixteen topics that a fire investigator is required
to have basic up-to-date knowledge beyond the high school
level in order to be qualified. The sixteen topics are:
(1) Fire science
(2) Fire chemistry
(3) Thermodynamics
(4) Thermometry
(5) Fire dynamics
(6) Explosion dynamics
(7) Computer fire modeling
(8) Fire investigation
(9) Fire analysis
(10) Fire investigation methodology
(11) Fire investigation technology
(12) Hazardous materials
(13) Failure analysis and analytical tools
(14) Fire protection systems
(15) Evidence documentation, collection, and
preservation
(16) Electricity and electrical systems15
These topics have not been very well defined so far, and
many of them overlap each other. (Who could argue that “fire

14

Fed. R. Evid. 702.

NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION 1033, STANDARD FOR
PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS FOR FIRE INVESTIGATOR 6 (2014).
15
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chemistry” and “fire dynamics” are not a subset of “fire
science”?) The next edition of NFPA 1033 will likely organize
this list to make it more coherent, and the topics themselves will
be limited. “Thermodynamics” is a huge field, and certain
aspects of thermodynamics are not required to understand fire,
so specifying the extent of knowledge required will be a useful
thing. It is obvious, however, that there are some aspects of fire
dynamics and fire chemistry that a fire investigator would be
helpless without.
NFPA 921 defines fire as “a rapid oxidation process,
which is a chemical reaction resulting in the evolution of light
and heat in varying intensities.”16 Light and heat are forms of
energy, so it makes sense that a fire investigator should be able
to describe the basic units of energy. Many do not know that the
basic units of energy are joules.
Energy can be given off rapidly or slowly, and the rate
at which energy is given off is known as power.17 Power is
measured in watts or kilowatts or megawatts, but there are
many fire investigators who cannot off the top of their heads
state that one watt is the amount of power equal to 1 joule per
second.18
Just as important as power is the concept of how much
area that power is spread out over. 36 kilowatts of power spread
evenly throughout a structure by a furnace’s circulation fan will
keep it comfortable on a cold winter day.19 Confining or
focusing that energy, say to the furnace closet, will result in
dramatically different consequences.20 Heat flux is defined as
power per unit area.21 Heat flux is measured in kilowatts per
square meter or watts per square centimeter.22 A fire
investigator should know that but many of them do not.

NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION 921, GUIDE FOR FIRE AND
EXPLOSION INVESTIGATIONS 3.3.66 (2017).
16

17

Id. at 3.3.143.
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Id. at 3.3.203.

19
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Fire investigators should also have some knowledge of
common fuel gases such as natural gas and propane. Many fire
investigators have no clue that the chemical formula for
methane, the main component of natural gas is CH4 or that the
chemical formula for propane (LP gas) is C3H8. Investigators
who do not know this simple fire chemistry can likely not
discuss why propane is heavier than air and why methane is
lighter than air or tell you how much air is required to burn a
cubic foot of natural gas or how much energy would be released
when that happens.
A simple quiz that will allow counsel to determine
whether a fire investigator is qualified as specified by NFPA
1033 is shown in Sidebar 1. Sidebar 2 contains excerpts of
testimony of supposedly qualified fire investigators who do not
know what they are talking about.
Exploring an investigator’s qualifications is a simple
matter in cases where depositions are allowed. This includes
almost all jurisdictions with regard to civil cases, but there are
only a handful of states that allow depositions in criminal cases,
and they are not allowed in federal criminal cases. In cases
where depositions are not allowed, an investigator’s
qualifications can be explored outside the presence of the jury
in an evidentiary hearing. Evidentiary hearings are highly
recommended whenever there is a question about the origin
and cause of the fire.
The Texas Forensic Science Commission (TX FSC), after
a multiyear investigation into the cases of Ernest Ray Willis
(who was exonerated) and Cameron Todd Willingham (who
was executed) made several recommendations to improve the
search for truth in fire cases. Recommendation 10 stated:
The FSC recommends that admissibility
hearings (also referred to as Daubert/Kelly
hearings) be conducted in all arson cases, due to
the inherently complex nature of fire science and
the continuously involving nature of fire
investigation standards. The FSC encourages
both prosecutors and defense counsel to
aggressively pursue admissibility hearings and
arson cases. In addition, judges should
affirmatively exercise their discretion to hold
such hearings in all arson cases as a measure of
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ensuring that fire science testimony is reliable
and relevant.23
Once an investigator fails a simple quiz, it is often not
even necessary to move to exclude his testimony. Sponsoring
counsel will do that when he or she recognizes what a disaster
it would be to prevent such a person as an expert.
Only after a fire investigator’s qualifications have been
explored is it appropriate to explore the methodology used to
reach the proposed opinion. Investigators who have
demonstrated a lack of qualifications are likely to be somewhat
rattled and unsure of themselves, which is why the
qualifications challenge should come first. Whether they are
qualified or not, fire experts are probably confident. If this
confidence can be shaken, the expert will be less convincing to
the court and the jury.

IV. DID THE EXPERT USE APPROPRIATE METHODOLOGY?
NFPA 921 has been generally accepted as the
appropriate methodology for conducting fire investigations
since 2000. It was that year that the International Association of
Arson Investigators (IAAI) formally urged the adoption of the
new edition of NFPA 921 by the NFPA,24 and it was also in that
year that the Justice Department published Fire and Arson Scene
Evidence, A Guide for Public Safety Personnel. This DOJ guide
advises that in any large loss or any loss that is believed to be
incendiary,
…the investigator should recognize limitations
of his or her own expertise and knowledge and
23 REPORT

OF THE TEXAS FORENSIC SCIENCE COMMISSION,
WILLIS/WILLINGHAM INVESTIGATION 48-49 (2011), available at
http://fsc.state.tx.us/documents/FINALWILLINGHAMREPORT04
18113.44pm.pdf.

John Lentini, Fire Investigation: Historical Perspective and Recent
Developments, 31(1) FORENSIC SCI. REV. 37-44 (Jan. 2019), available at
https://storage.googleapis.com/production-constantcontact-v1-07/507/175507/IaE9rCjE/528a5fb5af6447abaa3103d135e11505?fileNa
me=2019%20Fire%20Investigation%20Historical%20Perspective%20and%20Recent%20Developments.p
df.
24
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determine what personnel may be required to
process the scene according to NFPA 921 and
other recognize guidelines. Except in the most
obvious cases, the determination of a fire’s
origin may be a complex and difficult
undertaking requires specialized training and
experience as well as knowledge of generally
accepted scientific methods of fire investigators
investigation.25

So, counsel should always ask the expert if they
followed NFPA 921. The answer will almost always be yes,
even if that is not the case.
One of the most common ways that investigators violate
the guidance of NFPA 921 is in the use of negative corpus
methodology. Such thinking usually results in a determination
that the fire was intentionally set, although as two of the cases
below demonstrate, negative corpus methodology can also be
used to reach a conclusion that a fire was accidental. The
thinking goes like this: “I can’t find any accidental ignition
sources that could cause this fire, therefore, it must have been
intentionally set with an open flame and the perpetrator took
the flame away.” In the case of an accidental cause hypothesis
the investigator simply states, “Everything else was ruled out,”
even when there is no affirmative evidence to support the
hypothesis.
Negative corpus methodology is a result of expectation
bias. NFPA 921 says the following about negative corpus
thinking:
This process is not consistent with the scientific
method, is inappropriate, and should not be
used because it generates untestable hypotheses,
and may result in incorrect determinations of the
ignition source and first fuel ignited.26

TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP ON FIRE AND ARSON SCENE
INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, FIRE AND ARSON SCENE
EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR PUBLIC SAFETY PERSONNEL (2000), available at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/181584.pdf.
25

NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION 921, GUIDE FOR FIRE AND
EXPLOSION INVESTIGATIONS 19.6.5 (2017).
26

A MODEL FOR CONFRONTING FIRE INVESTIGATION ERRORS 11
In addition to negative corpus methodology, other
missteps include reliance on unconfirmed canine alerts (See the
Carr case, infra) and believing that fire patterns in a fully
involved room can be attributed to ignitable liquids on the basis
of visual appearance alone.27 An erroneous cause determination
usually involves believing in more than one discredited
“indicator.”
Counsel should explore the investigator’s history to
bring out evidence of bias. How many fires has this expert
investigated? Were all of those conducted for law enforcement?
Or were all of those conducted for insurance companies? Has
the expert ever investigated a fire on behalf of a criminal
defendant or a plaintiff in a first party arson case? Of the fires
they have investigated, how many has the expert determined to
have been intentionally set?
One way to probe an investigator’s biases is asking him
what opinions he has and when were those opinions formed?
While it is impossible to “un-see” a “For Sale” sign in the front
yard, investigators should not be considering motive until after
determining that the fire was intentionally set. Table 1 shows
two lists of factors, one relevant and the other potentially
irrelevant. If the task is simply to determine the origin and
cause of the fire, considering irrelevant data prior to
determining the cause will frequently result in erroneous
findings. Investigators should take steps to shield themselves
from biasing information like that in the “potentially
irrelevant” column until it is time to develop a suspect. Suspect
development should only take place if it is determined that a
crime has been committed.28
There have been literally thousands of Daubert
challenges to fire investigators, more so in civil cases than in
criminal cases, but filing a Daubert challenge in a civil case is
almost considered due diligence and every fire investigator, no
matter how qualified, is likely to see such a challenge if he goes
to court often enough. Because of the deferential standard for
review of a trial court’s admissibility decisions (abuse of
discretion), the record of appellate rulings is far smaller than the
record of trial court rulings. There is a website,
Dauberttracker.com that includes both trial court and appellate

27

Id. at 6.3.7.8.

28

Id. at 24.4.1.
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court rulings in Daubert challenges. This article will focus on
four seminal appellate court cases that have impacted the
admissibility of fire investigation testimony.

TABLE 1
Relevant Data Sources

Potentially Irrelevant Data
Sources

Firefighters’ observations
relevant to the fire, scene
security, and suppression
activities
Witness observations and
photos/videos relevant to the
fire and building contents
Occupancy
History of defects
Weather data
Pre-fire activities on the scene
Ignitable liquid location
Physical condition of the fire
scene

Financial records
History of fires
Criminal record
Claim file
Marital strife
Social media commentary
Gossip
Motive issues
Financial strife
House for sale – real estate
activity

Utilities

Indications of deception or
emotional state of the victim

Victim injuries

Personal records

Security, detection, and alarm
systems
Overpressure damage
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V. STATE OF GEORGIA V. WELDON WAYNE CARR29
This case arose out of an April 7, 1993 fire in Atlanta
Georgia at the home of Weldon and Patricia Carr.30 Mr. Carr
was a well-off owner of a nursery with a nationwide clientele
called Hastings Nursery.31 He and his wife were sleeping in the
same bed when they were awakened by smoke.32 They
attempted to find a chain ladder that had been stored under the
bed but were unable to do so.33 Mr. Carr and his wife attempted
to escape but were pushed back by smoke coming up the
stairway, so he opened a window to jump out, but he became
separated from Mrs. Carr.34 He jumped out the window and
cracked a vertebra when he landed. He ran across the street and
broke a neighbor’s door and got them to call 9-1-1.35
Firefighters were able to enter the house and find Mrs.
Carr, but she was unconscious.36 She died three days later at the
hospital.37 An anonymous phone call to the fire department
advised that they should “investigate very carefully.”38 When
the fire department’s arson investigator came to the scene, he

29

Carr v. Georgia, 482 S.E.2d 314, 314 (Ga. 1997).

30

Id. at 323 n.1.

Kieth Dunnavant, “The Prosecution Never Rests: The Making of
Nancy Grace,” ATLANTA MAGAZINE (November 1, 1996),
https://www.atlantamagazine.com/great-reads/the-prosecutionnever-rests-the-making-of-nancy-grace/.
31

32

Carr, 482 S.E.2d at 316.

Maurice Possley, “Weldon Wayne Carr,” NATIONAL REGISTRY OF
EXONERATIONS,
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetai
l.aspx?caseid=3936.
33

34

Id.

35

Id.

36

LENTINI, SCIENTIFIC PROTOCOLS FOR FIRE INVESTIGATION at 494-508.

37

Id.

38

Id.
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saw what he described as “pour patterns.”39 He also saw what
he thought was a “trailer”40 made of newspaper.
To make things much worse, Mrs. Carr was having an
affair with a neighbor and Mr. Carr had found out about it a
few months earlier. He had purchased recording equipment
and tapped his own telephone.41
An ignitable liquid detection dog (formerly called an
accelerant detection canine) was brought to the scene and
alerted 12 times, resulting in the collection of 12 samples and
their submission to the Georgia Division of Forensic Science.42
All 12 samples tested negative.43 The prosecutor, Nancy Grace,
working on her last case prior to joining Court TV as a talking
head, personally went to the crime laboratory and took
possession of the 12 samples and submitted them to a private
laboratory in Atlanta.44 The private laboratory had the same
results, i.e., all 12 samples tested negative.45
When the case was tried, the unconfirmed canine alerts
were admitted into evidence over the defendant’s objections.46
That became the major basis for Carr’s appeal, although the
Georgia Supreme Court found numerous other reversible
errors in the trial, including the conduct of an illegal search of
the Carr residence months after the fire, improper exclusion of
a defense witness (me) and prosecutorial misconduct during
the case during the trial.47
Some of the indicators used by the State to prove that
this was a set fire were spurious, but it was not possible to test
them during the pendency of the case because the trial court
had ruled (again erroneously) that Carr was required to turn
39

Id.

NFPA 921 defines a trailer as “solid or liquid fuel used to
intentionally spread or accelerate the spread of a fire from one area to
another.”
40

41

LENTINI, SCIENTIFIC PROTOCOLS FOR FIRE INVESTIGATION at 494-508.

42

Id.

43

Id.

44

Id.

45

Id.

46

Carr, 482 S.E.2d at 316.

47

Id. at 316-323.
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over any test results, whether they helped him or not, to the
State.48 Consequently, defense counsel declined to have much
testing performed prior to the trial.49
After the jury convicted Mr. Carr, testing began in
earnest.50 The testing demonstrated that none the indicators
used by the State were valid.51 Had this testing been run prior
to the trial, a different outcome might have ensued.
The Carr case was significant in that it was the first to
cite NFPA 921’s guidance on unconfirmed canine alerts. That
guidance was adopted as a result of the misuse of the
unconfirmed alerts in Carr’s case. First, the IAAI’s Forensic
Science Committee issued a position paper stating that
unconfirmed canine alerts were not reliable evidence.52 Then, in
1996, the NFPA Technical Committee on Fire Investigations
adopted the IAAI position and published it as a Tentative
Interim Amendment, an emergency declaration.53 Also, five fire
debris analysts from the Georgia Bureau of Investigation
Division of Forensic Sciences signed an affidavit stating that the
admission of the unconfirmed alerts was unreliable.54
The Georgia Supreme Court granted Mr. Carr a new
trial, but none of the Fulton County prosecutors assigned to the
case wanted to try it. They were aware that many holes had
been poked in the State’s case, and after several years, the actual
cause of the fire was determined to be a malfunctioning light
switch.55 Some four years after the conviction, the indictment

48

Id. at 318.

49

Id.

50

LENTINI, SCIENTIFIC PROTOCOLS FOR FIRE INVESTIGATION at 494-508.

51

Id.

52 IAAI

Forensic Science Committee, “Position Paper on Accelerant
Detection Canines,” FIRE AND ARSON INVESTIGATOR, no. 1 22-23
(1994), available at
https://app.box.com/s/xhxtymcd2rc10zl7eg2gh0slzd98cqls.
Symposium, NFPA 921: Past, Present and Future, INT’L SYMP. ON FIRE
INVESTIGATION (2006).
53

54

LENTINI, SCIENTIFIC PROTOCOLS FOR FIRE INVESTIGATION at 494-508.

55

Id.
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was dismissed because of the State’s failure to provide a speedy
trial.56

VI. MICHIGAN MILLERS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY V.
JANELLE BENFIELD57
This was the first Daubert challenge of a fire
investigator’s opinion in an arson case.
The fire occurred on July 6, 1992, at Mrs. Benfield’s
residence in Sarasota, Florida.58 Mrs. Benfield discovered the
fire when she returned home from a friend’s house.59 There
were four bags of clothing on the dining room table and that
was the only thing that burned.60 She was staying at her friend’s
because her husband had beaten her up two days earlier.61
Michigan Millers filed a declaratory action to void the
insurance policy, and the case went to trial in Federal District
Court.62 A fire investigator hired by Millers with 30 years’
experience determined the fire to be arson, but he was unable
to articulate the scientific method, and could not explain how
the chandelier over the dining room table where the fire started
could be eliminated as the ignition source.63 He did not even
have a photograph of the chandelier.64 There was an empty
bottle of lamp oil in the dining room, which he never had
tested.65 Mrs. Benfield’s lawyers made it clear that they were
going to challenge the investigator’s reliability, but Miller’s
counsel decided against holding a Daubert hearing, and stated
that he would just put his investigator on and let the judge

56

Carr, 278 Ga. at 128.

Michigan Millers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Benfield, 140 F.3d 915, 915 (11th
Cir. 1998).
57

58

Id. at 917-918.

59

Id. at 918.

60

Id.

61

Id.

62

Id. at 919.

63

Id. at 921.

64

Id.

65

Id.
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decide whether the testimony was reliable.66 At the end of the
investigator’s testimony, the judge turned to the jury and
instructed them to disregard everything they had just heard.67
Further, he entered a directed verdict in favor of Mrs. Benfield.68
This case was appealed to the 11th Circuit which ruled
that the judge did not abuse his discretion by eliminating the
testimony, but he did abuse his discretion by entering the
directed verdict because there was a firefighter who did not
claim to be a fire scientist, who stated that based on his
experience, it was his opinion that the fire was intentionally
set.69
The 11th Circuit ruling had the curious effect of
insurance defense attorneys encouraging fire investigators not
to use the word “science” in their reports or testimony.70
Apparently, the 11th Circuit misread the Daubert decision and
ruled that if one claimed to be a fire scientist, one was subject to
a Daubert reliability challenge, but if one claimed only to be a
fire investigator, a Daubert challenge was not appropriate.71
This decision was overturned by the Supreme Court’s
decision in the Kumho case, which also originated in the 11th
Circuit. In Kumho, the Court held that it was not the judge’s job
to try to figure out whether an expert’s testimony was
“scientific,” “technical,” or “other.”72 It is only the judge’s job to
determine if the testimony is relevant and reliable. 73 The
Benfield case resulted in the production of an amicus brief by the
IAAI in 1997 which argued that because fire investigation was
a “less scientific” discipline, fire investigators should not be
subjected to reliability challenges.74 The Kumho court
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unanimously rejected that argument.75 When this author read
the IAAI’s amicus brief, he found it necessary to file his own,
which was submitted to the 11th Circuit but strongly objected
to by Michigan Millers.76 The case eventually settled, but not
before thoroughly shaking up the world of fire investigation.

VII. WEISGRAM V. MARLEY77
This case arose out of a December 30, 1993 fire in Fargo,
North Dakota.78 The fire was discovered around 6 AM and was
fatal to Bonnie Weisgram.79 The main fuel involved in the fire
was an L-shaped sofa in the living room, but a sofa cushion was
found in the entryway, where there was additional fire
damage.80 A disabled smoke alarm was found on the floor with
a protection pattern under it, indicating it had been taken down
prior to deposition of smoke on the carpet.81
Three experts were involved in bringing this case
against Marley, the manufacturer of an electric baseboard
heater.82 Despite numerous problems with the case, the jury
awarded $500,000 to Bonnie’s son Chad, and $100,000 to State
Farm Fire and Casualty Company for its subrogated loss.83
Marley appealed.84
Marley’s expert opined that at some time that night,
Bonnie Weisgram dropped a lighted cigarette behind a cushion
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of the sofa, which eventually started a smoldering fire.85 The
smoke detector activated, and Weisgram disabled it.86 Believing
she had doused the fire in the couch, she removed the sofa
cushion to the entryway.87 At some point, she opened the
bedroom window and the front door to clear the house of
smoke.88 The cushion and the sofa continued to smolder,
producing the smoke and the carbon monoxide that eventually
killed Weisgram.89 Under the influence of the alcohol and a
sleeping aid, she was unaware that the fire continued to burn
until it was too late.90 The smoldering cushion in the entryway
slowly burned through the floor and eventually caused the
flaming fire around the entrance that was spotted at 6:00 a.m.91
The baseboard heater had been operating without
incident for 15 years, and there were other potential ignition
sources in the room of origin that were not examined.92 Mrs.
Weisgram was a smoker with a blood alcohol concentration of
0.15.93 A fire captain, Freeman, was allowed to opine where the
fire started and also that the heater was the cause of the fire.94
The Eighth Circuit ruled that the judge had not abused his
discretion by allowing Freeman to opine as to origin, but he had
abused his discretion when he allowed him to give testimony
about the cause of the fire.95 The sofa that the Captain said was
the first fuel ignited was 6 to 8 feet away from the heater.96 The
Captain admitted he was not an electrical expert and had no
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idea what caused the malfunction.97 The Eighth Circuit held,
“Freeman’s qualification as a fire investigator did not give him
free rein to speculate before the jury as to the cause of the fire
by relying on inferences that have absolutely no record
support.”98
The second expert was an electrician from Ohio by the
name of Ralph Dolence who claimed on more than one occasion
to have conducted 15,000 fire investigations in 22 years99 (do the
math). He testified as a “fire investigator and a technical
forensic expert.”100 His basis for pointing at the baseboard
heater was, “There is no other explanation. Everything else is
ruled out by Captain Freeman,” a negative corpus
determination.101 Dolence had never visited the scene but was
allowed to opine that after 15 years of operating without
incident both the thermostat and the high limit control failed
simultaneously and did not function to shut the heater off.102 He
could not identify what caused the heater to run away and he
had no idea what caused the thermostat to fail.103 He agreed
with the proposition that there were no design defects in the
heater in part because he could not create a similar overheating
episode in the undamaged exemplar heater that had been
retrieved after the fire from the apartment adjoining the
townhouse where Mrs. Weisgram died.104 The Eighth Circuit
held that the District Court abused its discretion by permitting
Dolence to testify as an expert witness regarding matters about
which he could only speculate.105 They stated, “As with

97

Id.

98

Id. at 519.

P. Trexler, Prosecution Expert Rejects Short as Cause, ABJ (February
8, 2002).
99

100

Marley, 169 F.3d at 519.

101

Id.

102

Id. at 519-20.

103

Id. at 520.

104

Id.

105

Id.

A MODEL FOR CONFRONTING FIRE INVESTIGATION ERRORS 21
Freeman’s testimony there is no reasonable factual basis for
Dolence’s opinion.”106
A third expert was a metallurgist consulted by
Dolence.107 He was qualified as an expert in the properties of
metals, but he was not an expert in fire origin and cause, in
baseboard heater operation or in the designing of contacts for
baseboard heaters.108 Even so, he was allowed to opine that the
heater contacts were defectively designed because they were
serrated.109 The Circuit Court stated that the District Court
abused its discretion when it permitted testimony from the
metallurgist.110
Weisgram appealed to the US Supreme Court which
granted Certiorari to decide if the Eighth Circuit should have
granted the plaintiffs a new trial with new experts.111 The
Eighth Circuit had entered a judgment for Marley as a matter
of law, and the Supreme Court had to decide if that was
appropriate.112 They stated that it was and that to rule otherwise
would have given plaintiffs a second bite at the apple.113

VIII. TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE V. MAGNETEK 114
This was a product liability subrogation case.115 A fire
on November 9, 1998, in Lakewood, Colorado, destroyed
Sammy’s restaurant.116 Upon their arrival, the fire department
found only smoke, no fire, until the fire caused the kitchen floor
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to collapse, indicating a fire in the basement.117 There was a
florescent light in the basement and, according to the experts,
no other potential ignition sources.118 Thus, the light was the
cause.119 (Another negative corpus determination.) The ballast in
the light, manufactured by MagneTek still contained a thermal
cut off (TCO), which still functioned after the fire.120 It opened
at 232° F.121 A similar ballast when shorted, i.e., the TCO was
bypassed, reached a stable temperature of 300° F.122 The ignition
temperature of wood is well in excess of 400° F.123
There is a never-proven hypothesis that upon continued
exposure to a heat source below its ignition temperature, the
ignition temperature of wood is lowered to a point where a heat
source of only 200° F might ignite it
MagneTek moved for summary judgment and the
exclusion of the plaintiff’s electrical engineer.124 The trial court
granted the motion and Truck appealed to the Tenth Circuit,
which upheld the exclusion.125
In its ruling, the Tenth Circuit adopted some
unfortunate terminology, which points out the problems with
having judges act as scientists. They stated:
There appears to be some confusion among the
parties, the District Court, and apparently even
the scientific community as to the proper
terminology for the theory of long-term low
temperature wood ignition and the charring it
involves. This court is not in a position to decide
such questions for the scientific community but
for the purposes of this opinion we will refer to
this process as “pyrolysis.” To the extent we use
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the term “pyrophoric carbon,” we are talking
about the substance charred wood.126
They held that the District Court did not abuse its
discretion when it ruled that under the Daubert trilogy,
pyrolysis was not yet a sufficiently reliable theory upon which
to base an expert opinion about the cause of the Sammy’s fire.127
The only problem with this ruling is that the
“shorthand” caused much consternation in the fire
investigation community. Pyrolysis always happens when
wood burns.128 It has to.129 Judges cannot change the laws of
chemistry.
Despite the confusion about pyrolysis and pyrophoric
carbon, the MagneTek case has been repeatedly cited to counter
the hypothesis that long-term low temperature heating can
cause ignition.

IX. IS ORIGIN DETERMINATION EVEN A VALID DISCIPLINE?
Origin determination is a fire investigator’s “core
competency.” If one cannot determine where the fire started, it
is unlikely one will be able to determine why, yet repeated
experiments designed to assess fire investigators’ ability to
correctly determine the origin have so far not yielded any
validation of this skill. The point of origin is defined as the exact
physical location within the area of origin where a heat source
and the fuel interact resulting in a fire or explosion.130 So how
good are fire investigators at actually determining where a fire
started?
For many years, the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco
Firearms and Explosives (ATF) conducted an exercise at the
beginning of its advanced origin and cause school, which it
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presented at the Federal Law Enforcement Training center in
Brunswick, Georgia.131
Fire investigators from around the country who had
been flown into Brunswick at government expense were
presented with a fire scene of known origin.132 They were asked
on the first day of the course to write down where they thought
the fire started and submit their results anonymously.133 Over
the years, fire investigators got no more than 8 to 10% of the
answers correct.134
In 2005, three ATF certified fire investigators decided to
take this exercise to the general fire investigation community.
They ran their experiment at a fire investigation seminar in Las
Vegas.135 They set up two rooms like bedrooms and ignited the
fire. They let it burn for two minutes beyond flashover.136 Then
they invited the attendees to choose the quadrant where the fire
originated.137 Relying on nothing but the interpretation of fire
patterns, more than 90% of the participants chose the wrong
quadrant.138 The experiment was repeated in the second room
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and the same results were obtained.139 In each case, only three
of 53 investigators correctly identify the quadrant of origin.140
Agent Steve Carman, one of the architects of the
experiment, began teaching the fire investigators who would
listen that perhaps they were not doing it right.141 He concluded
that the old days of finding the origin by using the lowest and
deepest char are over, but there was quite a bit of pushback.142
In 2007, the ATF conducted a similar exercise in
Oklahoma City.143 In this case, they set three fires.144 One fire
burned for 30 seconds beyond flashover.145 The second fire
burned for 70 seconds beyond flashover, and the third fire
burned for three minutes beyond flashover.146 Again,
participants at a fire investigation seminar were asked to select
the quadrant of origin.147 There were 70 attendees.148 For the 30second fire, all 70 ventured a guess as to the quadrant of origin,
and 84% got it right.149 For the fire that burned for 70 seconds
beyond flashover, six investigators called the origin
undetermined.150 Of the 64 who ventured a guess, 69% got it
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right.151 For the fire that burned for three minutes beyond
flashover (and most fire investigators rarely see fires that
burned for that brief a period of time) only 25% correctly
identified the quadrant of origin.152 25% is no better than
random chance.
In 2012, Tinsley and Gorbett published “Fire
Investigation Origin Determination Survey.”153 In that study,
587 self-selected fire investigators working independently,
viewed photos and data from a fire that burned for only one
minute after flashover.154 The error rate was 22 to 26%.155
As of 2020, there has not been a single experiment conducted
where fire investigators were able to demonstrate their ability
to determine the origin correctly if the fire burned more than
three minutes.
The length of burning should always be a question that
an expert proposing to opine about the origin is asked, and if he
is picking an origin out of a fully involved compartment that
burn more than three minutes, counsel should challenge the
validity of that finding.

X. EXPERT ASSISTANCE IS ESSENTIAL
Unless they specialize in fire cases, most attorneys will
only encounter one or two fire investigations in a career. Thus,
it is necessary to engage an expert in almost all cases.
Recent court cases have established that proceeding
without an expert is per se ineffective, and so getting funding
from the court is not the difficult problem that that it once was.
Two cases to cite if the court is reluctant to fund an expert are:
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(1) Dugas v. Coplan from the First Circuit and (2) Richey v.
Bradshaw from the Sixth Circuit.
In the Dugas case, the Appeals Court found that counsel
had been ineffective even though he toured the scene with his
client, did some reading, and took the depositions of the State’s
experts.156 They found that it fell below the constitutional
requirement for effective assistance because counsel failed to
consult with an expert, even though he planned to challenge the
State’s experts regarding their determination that the fire was
intentionally set and not accidental.157
The Richey case is even more instructive. Richey’s
attorney hired an expert, but one who was determined by the
Sixth Circuit to be incompetent.158 They held that effective
assistance required hiring not just any expert but a competent
expert.159
In the past, this author was often asked to provide
services pro bono because counsel could not afford to hire an
expert. That has not generally been the case since 2010. In fact,
even in cases where the arson is obvious, this author gets
retained to review them because counsel feels that having the
scientific case looked at by an expert is a matter of due diligence.
Even in the obvious cases, questioning of the expert’s
qualifications has resulted in benefits to the accused.
Qualifications challenges have also resulted in substantial
reductions in the settlement value of civil cases.160

XI. CONCLUSIONS
Fire litigators need to know that fire investigation, as a
profession, has changed dramatically over the past three
decades and it continues to advance today. Challenges to
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experts are becoming more common and generally expected.
Counsel should question the qualifications of experts because
the fire investigation profession contains a substantial cadre of
unqualified investigators. Despite the confidence of many
experts, fire investigation is very difficult, and the error rate is
unknown, but potentially very high. Many of the people
practicing fire investigation do not meet the qualifications for
fire investigator set forth in NFPA 1033, and even those who get
past a test of their knowledge are likely to have engaged in
questionable methodology. If you do not vet your expert,
adverse counsel surely will.
Methodology should follow NFPA 921 and if it does not,
investigators need to be able to explain why not.
The core competency of fire investigators, origin
determination, has not been demonstrated to be valid, even
though courts are unlikely to exclude it on that basis.
Because of recent court decisions, getting funding for
your expert is not as difficult as it once was. The judge should
understand that refusing to supply funding is the same thing as
causing you to render ineffective assistance.
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SIDEBAR 1. A QUALIFICATIONS CHALLENGE
Because NFPA 1033 lists sixteen areas that a fire
investigator is required to be knowledgeable about, challenging
an expert’s qualifications to testify is a straightforward exercise.
Begin with one hard series of questions, and if the expert is
capable of answering correctly, that might be the end of it,
especially if you have to do this in front of the jury. If, on the
other hand, the expert cannot speak intelligibly about heat flux,
it is time to circle around and go back to the basics.
You are not asking these questions because you want to
know. You are asking because you want to see what the expert
knows. “I can look that up for you” is a common but
unacceptable answer. The witness should not be allowed to do
this “open book” style. You want to find out what he knows off
the top of his head.
Here are the hard questions:
Q. What is heat flux?
A. Heat flux is a measure of the rate of heat transfer to a surface.
Q. What units are used to measure heat flux?
A. Heat flux is measured in kilowatts per square meter or watts
per square centimeter.
Here are the basic questions:
Q. Are you familiar with NFPA 1033?
Q. Do you agree that NFPA 1033 applies to everyone who
investigates fires?
Q. Do you agree that NFPA 1033 applies to you?
Q. Do you believe that you meet the requirements of NFPA
1033?
Q. Do you agree that NFPA 1033 contains a list of subject matter
areas that fire investigators should be knowledgeable about?
Q. Do you agree that that list of subject matter areas includes
fire science, fire chemistry, and fire dynamics?
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Q. Do you agree that fire is a chemical reaction that gives off
energy in the form of heat and light?
Q. Do you agree that a person who investigates fires, therefore,
should know something about energy?
Q. In the metric system, what are the basic units of energy?
A. Joules. (Kilowatt hours and Calories are acceptable answers.
BTU (British Thermal Unit) is a less acceptable answer, because
it’s not a metric unit.)
Q. What is the definition of power?
A. Power is a measure of the amount of energy given off per unit
time.
Q. In the metric system, what are the basic units of power?
A. Watts (W), or kilowatts (kW), or megawatts (MW).
Q. What is a watt?
A. One watt equals one joule per second.
Q. If I walk outside on a sunny day at noon, approximately
what is the radiant heat flux that I would experience?
A. Approximately 1 kW per square meter.
Q. In a typical compartment fire, what is the radiant heat flux at
floor level at the onset of flashover?
A. Approximately 20 kW per square meter.
Q. What is the concentration of oxygen in the air we breathe?
A. 20.95%. (20% or 21% is close enough.)
Q. Do you agree that the combustion of hydrogen is the
simplest of all combustion reactions?
A. It is. (If the witness will not agree, ask him if he can name a
simpler combustion reaction.)
Q. What is the chemical symbol for hydrogen?
A. H.
Q. What is the chemical formula for hydrogen gas?
A. H2.
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Q. What is the chemical formula for the combustion of
hydrogen?
A. 2H2 + O2 à 2H2O.
Q. Do you agree that the combustion of methane, which is the
main component of natural gas, is the simplest of all hydrocarbon
combustion reactions?
A. It is. (If the witness will not agree, ask him if he can name a
simpler hydrocarbon combustion reaction.)
Q. Do you know what the chemical formula for methane is?
A. CH4
Q. Is methane lighter than air or heavier than air?
A. Lighter.
Q. Can you describe the combustion reaction of methane?
A. CH4 + 2O2 à CO2 + 2H2O (One volume of methane plus two
volumes of oxygen produces one volume of carbon dioxide
plus two volumes of water vapor.)
Q. How many volumes of air are necessary to completely burn
one volume of methane?
A. 10. (Because air is only ~20% oxygen.)
Q. How many BTUs is a cubic foot of methane going to produce
when it burns?
A. 1,000
Q. Do you know what the chemical formula for propane (the
main component of LP gas) is?
A. C3H8.
Q. Is propane lighter than air or heavier than air?
A. Heavier.
Q. How many volumes of air are necessary to completely burn
one volume of propane?
A. 25
Q. How many BTUs of is a cubic foot of propane going to
produce when it burns?
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A. 2,500
Q. What is heat release rate?
A. The rate at which heat energy is generated by burning.
Q. What units are used to describe the heat release rate of a
fire?
A. Kilowatts (kW), or megawatts (MW).
Although it may be uncomfortable, you should apply
this simple quiz to your own expert. If he is unable to pass this
quiz, you might want to think about finding an expert who has
this really basic knowledge.
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SIDEBAR 2. THE VALUE OF CHALLENGING AN EXPERT’S
QUALIFICATIONS
Here are five examples of the value of challenging an
expert’s qualifications that resulted in cases being dismissed or
settling for a pittance because the fire investigator
demonstrated a lack of knowledge that is required by NFPA
1033. The author has many transcripts like these but will refrain
from identifying names.
1. Investigator who claims a B.S. in Fire Science, testifying in a
Tennessee capital murder case that he alleged was started with a
propane-fired weed burner:
Q. What are the basic units of power called?
A. AC and DC.
Q. I'm sorry?
A. AC and DC.
Q. Have you ever heard of a watt?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know what a watt is?
A. No, sir.
Q. Okay. How is the size of a fire measured?
A. I’m unsure at this time.
Q. Okay. What is radiant heat flux?
A. I’m unsure at this time.
…
Q. Do you know how many BTUs are present in a typical cubic
foot of propane?
A. Not at this time.
Q. Do you know what the chemical formula for propane is?
A. I'm unsure at this time.
Q. Can you write down the chemical equation that describes the
burning of propane in air?
A. I'm unsure.
Q. How many volumes of oxygen are required to burn a volume
of propane?
A. Unsure.
Q. How many volumes of air are required to burn a volume of
propane?
A. Unsure.
Q. Have you ever tried to set wood on fire using a propane
torch?
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A. No, sir.
Q. Do you agree that there’s both a liquid phase and a vapor
phase inside the propane tank?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know how much vapor a given volume of liquid
produces?
A. No, sir, unsure at this time.
The charges were dismissed and all records of the
indictment were purged from the record.
2. Professional Engineer testifying in a North Carolina
wrongful death case involving carbon monoxide:
Q. How much -- what percentage of air is oxygen generally
speaking?
A. Best I remember around 89 percent -- oh, that's nitrogen,
probably 10, 11 percent. I don't remember exactly.
The case settled immediately after the transcript
arrived.
3. Fire investigator who claims an associate’s degree in fire
science testifying in a Michigan civil arson case:
Q. What’s radiant heat flux?
A. The -- I know what radiant heat is. I don’t know the specific
definition of radiant heat flex.
THE REPORTER: Flux or flex?
COUNSEL: Flux, F-L-U-X.
THE WITNESS: Flux, okay.
…
Q. What's the concentration of oxygen in air?
A. What's the concentration of it?
Q. Yeah.
A. Like the air we breathe? 92 percent. I don't know if that's
right or not but it's in that area. (Not on this planet!)
The case settled.
4. Fire investigator retained by the plaintiff insurance
company testifying in a slam dunk subrogation case in Texas.
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The fire was caused by the defendant’s negligent installation
of a water heater.
Q. Can you tell the jury what the difference between energy
and power is?
A. I don't know.
Q. Can you tell the jury what the basic units of power are?
A. I don't know.
Q. Can you tell the jury what the definition of “heat release
rate” is?
A. The heat release rate is the rate of – the amount of fuel that's
burning in comparison with the temperature and amount of
heat it's producing.
Q. Can you tell the jury what the definition of “energy release
rate” is?
A. No.
Q. Well, how is heat release rate measured?·Let me ask you
that.
A. I don’t know.
Q. Do you know what factors influence the heat release rate of
a particular fuel?
A. I don’t know all the things to it. There's many different
variables into it.
Q. Can you tell me any of the variables?
A. The type of material being -- that is being consumed,
atmosphere. Is it a sealed room?· Is it open air?
Q. But you don't know how heat release rate is typically
measured?
A. No.
Q. Do you know what a watt is?
A. I know the basics of a watt, ohms and – I don't know -- no.
Q. Do you know what radiant heat flux is?
A. No.
The case settled for a small fraction of its true value.
5. City fire marshal testifying in a D.C. arson case.
Q. Do you agree that the combustion of hydrogen in the
presence of air to form water is the simplest of all chemical
combustion reactions?
A. I don’t know.
Q. What is the chemical symbol for hydrogen?
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A. I don’t know.
Q. Can you tell me the formula for the combustion of
hydrogen?
A. I don’t know.
The Judge, sua sponte, announced, “I’m sorry. If you
don’t know H2O, you will not be rendering opinion testimony
in my courtroom.” He later acquitted the defendant for lack of
evidence.

